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ABSTRACT To realise the full potential of modern low cost mini-micro-nano-satellite missions, regular and 
affordable launch opportunities are required.  It is simply not economic to launch satellites of 5-300kg on single 
dedicated launchers costing typically $10-20M per launch. Whilst there have been periodic 'piggy-back' launches 
of small satellites on US launchers, these have been infrequent and often experienced significant delays due the 
vagaries of the main (paying!) payload. 
In 1988, Arianespace provided a critical catalyst to the microsatellite community when it developed the ASAP 
platform on Ariane-4 providing, for the first time, a standard interface with affordable commercial launch 
contracts for small payloads up to 50kg.  Some 20 small satellites have since been launched on the Ariane-4 
ASAP ring, however as most of these microsatellite missions seek low Earth orbit (especially sun-synchronous) 
the number of prime missions into these orbit has declined since 1996 and with it the useful low cost launch 
opportunities for microsatellites. Whilst Ariane-5 has an enhanced capacity ASAP, it has yet to be widely used 
due to the infrequent launches, higher costs, and the unpopularity of the GTO orbit required by the majority of 
customers. China, Japan and India have also provided occasional launches for small payloads, but not yet on a 
regular basis. 
Fortunately, the growing interest and demand for microsatellites coincided with the emergence of regular, low 
cost launch opportunities from the former Soviet Union (FSU) - both as secondary 'piggy-back' missions or as 
multiple microsatellite payloads on converted military ICBMs. Indeed, the FSU now supplies the only affordable 
means of launching minisatellites (200-500kg) into LEO as dedicated missions on converted missiles as these 
larger 'small satellites' are often too big to be carried 'piggy-back'.  The entrepreneurial effort of leading FSU 
rocket & missile organisations has taken over providing launches for the small satellite community with an 
excellent track record. 
However, negotiating and completing a Launch Services Contract for a micro-minisatellite with any launcher 
organisation is a complex matter and risky territory for the unwary or inexperienced - who may fall prey to 
unexpected costs and delays.  Whilst this warning should be heeded when dealing with European and US 
organisations, it is particularly relevant to negotiating launches from the FSU where there is a plethora of 
agencies and organisations providing a bewildering range of launch vehicles and options. Furthermore, the FSU 
has developed a very different technical and managerial philosophy towards launchers when compared with the 
West and this can be unnerving to 'first-time buyers'. Organisations experienced in dealing in the FSU will 
encounter an excellent service - once the launch service agreement has been thoroughly and fiercely negotiated 
in every detail. Inexperienced buyers have encountered delays, lost opportunities, unexpected taxes, additional 
cost for services or facilities not originally specified, and frustration at the different procedures used in the FSU.  
Fortunately, all this can be avoided and the FSU is the current mainstay for launching small satellites quickly, 
affordably and reliably.  
 
SSTL has unique experience gathered over 22 years in handling launches for small satellites, ranging from a 6kg 
nanosatellite, 50-120kg microsatellites, and a 325kg minisatellite, using 7 different launchers from the USA, 
Russia, Ukraine, and Europe.  This experience, and working closely with organisations in the FSU, has enabled 
SSTL to provide good value launches for its small satellite customers without delay and with an excellent launch 
success. 
The paper will describe the experience gained by Surrey, across the various launch providers, in successfully 
launching 21 small satellites - affordably, reliably and quickly. It will highlight the key factors that are necessary 
to ensure a 'good experience'. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Today, small satellites have developed to play a full 
part of space technology. They have grown from 
experimental activities to operational systems. One 
defining factor in the development has been the 
availability of launch opportunities at reasonable cost. 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, spacecraft were 
generally only getting bigger and heavier. The 
possibilities offered by the emergence of miniaturized 
electronics was recognised by researchers at the 
University of Surrey, who managed to build the first 
modern, microprocessor-controlled microsatellite 
UoSAT-1. This satellite was launched in 1981 by 
NASA as a secondary payload on a Delta-2 launcher, 
together with the Solar Mesosphere explorer. 
 
Figure 1 UoSAT-1 spacecraft with SME primary payload on a Delta 
launcher (Highlighted) 
UoSAT-1 exceeded its orbital life expectancy by five 
years, and, when it finally re-entered after more than 
eight years in orbit, it was still functional. Based on 
this success a second satellite was built and UoSAT-2 
was launched again as a piggy-back payload on Delta 
in 1984, together with the Landsat-5 primary payload. 
This satellite is still operational after more than 18 
years in orbit. 
SSTL has continued to launch spacecraft on a variety 
of launchers: as secondary payloads; shared launches; 
and one as primary (only) passenger [1]. 
 
Figure 2 UoSAT-2 spacecraft with LandSat-5 primary 
Table 1 shows the launch vehicles and the number of 
SSTL spacecraft launched on them. 
 




Delta-2 2 2 
Ariane-4 6 10 
Tsiklon 1 1 
Dnepr 2 2 
Kosmos 2 3 
Zenith 1 2 
Athena 1 1 
TOTAL 14 21 
Table 1 SSTL launch history 
 
2 SECONDARY LAUNCHES 
 
Secondary launches have developed as a result of the 
increasing capability of launch vehicles. The available 
mass is not always being used completely by the 
primary payload, this is normally compensated for by 
the use of balancing weights. A typical Ariane-4 
launch may have a 200 kg aluminium ring inserted 
between the launcher and the payload when launched 
into low Earth orbit. 
 
The fairing diameter is also mostly fixed, and any 
unused space could be made available to secondary 
spacecraft. 
Over the years NASA offered secondary launches into 
Low Earth Orbit for free to educational and amateur 
organisations like AMSAT. Twelve such spacecraft 
have been launched, starting with OSCAR-1 in 1961 
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to SUNSAT in 1999. This is a rate of about one every 
three years. The FSU has also launched some 19 of 
educational and amateur satellites over the years. 
 
3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SECONDARY 
LAUNCHES 
 
The defining characteristic of a secondary launch is 
that the mission must accept all constraints imposed 
by the primary payload: 
- Launch date 
- Launch date slips (or advancement!) 
- Launch time 
- Launch cancellations 
- Available mass 
- Available (often fixed) volume 
- Target orbit 
- EMC-RFI limitations 
- Permitted materials used in the spacecraft 
 
As an illustration, typically when a secondary 
passenger spacecraft is not ready in time, or the launch 
agency deems that the risk of launching it would be to 
great to the main passenger or the launch vehicle, they 
can decide to leave the satellite on the ground, and 
launch a mass dummy instead. Arianespace for 
instance makes the secondary passengers manufacture 
and deliver a mass dummy to the launch site at the 
start of the campaign for just such an eventuality. 
 
Being a secondary passenger may impose additional 
difficulties 
- Access to the launcher for integration may be 
restricted to certain periods 
- Few or no telemetry lines available for launch 
phase information 
- Working area may be restricted 
- There may be no control over the attitude or the 
timing of the spacecraft separation in orbit. 
- There may be a delay in being allowed to switch 
the spacecraft on once in orbit to allow for 
sufficient distance from the main payload 
 
For all these difficulties, there is the one major 
advantage: the launch cost is only a fraction, less than 
10% normally, of the cost of the complete launch. 
 
The launch price is often based in the marginal cost 
i.e. the additional cost incurred by the launch agency 
in order to integrate and launch the secondary satellite, 
although now that the market for small satellites is 
maturing, some launch agencies are offering launch 
prices based on the launch mass of the satellite: 
figures of 10,000 to 15,000 US$/kg have been quoted. 
 
4 ARIANE-4 ASAP  
 
As mentioned before, NASA has over the years 
provided on average one launch every three years 
suitable for secondary payloads, with no guarantee 
that this will continue. This meant that, when the 
University of Surrey decided to further develop its 
space activities, it was necessary to place this on a 
more commercial footing. 
 
 In 1985 a commercial company, called Surrey 
Satellite Technology was founded. The first satellite 
launch opportunity targeted by the new company was 
again one offered by NASA, but the primary satellite 
was delayed by several years, which meant that the 
launch opportunity was effectively lost. 
 
At that time, around 1988, ArianeSpace developed the 
Ariane Structure for Auxiliary Payloads, or ASAP. 
This is a ring type structure, mounted on the third 
stage of the Ariane-4 launch vehicle. The aim of this 
structure was to provide regular access to space for 
small payloads by providing a simple dedicated 
interface [2].  
 
Figure 3 UoSAT-3, UoSAT-4 and four 10kg microsatellites  with SPOT-2 
primary on Ariane-4 ASAP no.1 (Vol. 35) 
ArianeSpace had several reasons to develop this 
structure: [3] 
- ArianeSpace wanted to develop the market for 
small satellites 
- Arianespace wanted to offer this launch option as 
a trial to customers for main payloads, as a way to 
get teams trained in launch campaigns, essentially 
as a marketing exercise. 
- There was spare capacity on most Ariane 
launches, especially those into Low Earth Orbits. 
Developing a standard interface, and qualifying this 
with mass dummies, can reduce the analysis activity 
for each individual spacecraft, saving cost overall. The 
Ariane-4 ASAP system has been used on 7 occasions, 
once in GTO, all the others in LEO. SSTL has 
launched spacecraft on all the LEO ASAPs flown, and 
it provided a number of sub-systems including the 
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separation system for the two spacecraft on the other 
ASAP into GTO. 
 
Figure 4 UoSAT-5 and others on ASAP no.2 
5 LAUNCH AGENCY ACTIVITY 
 
The launch agency has to perform a great number of 
activities in order to launch any satellite, almost 
independent of its mass, and even for a secondary 
satellite the list is quite extensive. It is based on the 
extent of these activities that the launch price is 
determined, rather than on the mass fraction of the 
secondary payload in relation to the overall launch 
mass. It is often the case that several secondary 
satellites sharing one launch pay the same price, even 
though their mass and volumes may differ widely. 
 
Typical direct mission related activities performed by 
or on behalf of the launch agency include: 
- Mass and volume analysis 
- Interface definition 
- Interface validation tests (fit-check meeting) 
- Orbital separation analysis 
- Launch campaign support 
- Cleanroom space provision 
- Launch 
- Orbital debris analysis 
- Orbital elements generation  
 
The launch agency must also negotiate with the 
primary customer, as there is normally no financial 
benefit for main passenger in having secondary 
spacecraft on the same launch. Issues to be negotiated 
are for instance: 
- Risk analysis 
- Insurance 
- Timescales for launch campaign activities 
- Separation analysis 
- EMC/RFI between main and secondary 
passengers 
 
The following hardware is typically supplied by or 
through the launch agency as part of the contract: 
- Spacecraft mechanical interface 
- Spacecraft electrical interface 
- Ordnance firing lines 
- Telemetry lines through the launcher 
- Separation system hardware (pyros) 
- Specialised tools to enable integration 
- Space on the fairing for a mission logo 
 
Additional services normally supplied by or through 
the launch agency: 
- Safety and security at the launch site 
- Customs support for import of the spacecraft and 
associated support equipment, and return of the 
support equipment. 
- Local transport 
- Import and export licence application support 
 
All these services are normally subject to negotiation, 
and are usually captured in the launch services 
contract. The actual details are specified in the various 
appendices, of which the main one is the Interface 
Control Document 
 
6 INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENT 
 
The Interface Control Document (or ICD) is a 
collection of specifications of all technical and non-
technical issues relating to the launch of a satellite. 
Subjects covered range from detailed mechanical and 
electrical interface drawings between the spacecraft 
and the launcher, to requirements for tests to be 
performed on the spacecraft before integration, and 
e.g. what medical and transport facilities are available 
at the launch site, what mains voltage is available and 
what plugs to bring for this. 
 
The ICD is a ‘living’ document, which is under 
controlled release, and various updates are published 
during the course of the contract to keep track of 
information as it develops. It is the main technical 
document between launch provider and customer, and 
all and any information relating to the launch and 
associated activities must be recorded either in it, or 
referred to in it. 
 
Figure 5 KITSat-1 and S-80/T spacecraft on ASAP no.3 
 
Launch agencies like ArianeSpace, who have a long 
history of dealing with commercial customers, have a 
standard document, in which the details are completed 
as the activities progress. Other launch suppliers will 
negotiate a new ICD for every launch, and this is often 
a learning process for both sides. FSU launch 
providers for instance may have a different 
understanding of what constitutes a clean room 
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compared to western launch ranges, but on the other 
hand most facilities are quite adequate and SSTL has 
provided its own portable cleanroom to be set up in 
any assembly building on site. This way expensive 
refits of the launch facilities can be avoided. 
 
7 THE LAST ARIANE-4 ASAP LAUNCHES 
 
SSTL has launched ten satellites using the Ariane-4 
ASAP, with a yearly launch between 1990 and 1993, 
but after that only a few of them have been available 
for launch into Low Earth Orbit. Only two such 
ASAP’s have flown since 1993, both with military 
primary payloads. This restricted the access for 
secondary customers to military spacecraft. SSTL 
launched the Cerise and Clementine military 
spacecraft on these launches, in 1995 and 1999 
respectively.  
 
As Ariane-4 is no longer produced, and the last ones 
are not planned to go into LEO, this launch 
availability has now ceased. 
 
8 FSU LAUNCHES 
 
Launch vehicles of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
tend to be manufactured in large batches, with little 
possibility of modification. The main spacecraft 
however come in a wide variety. These spacecraft tend 
to use a few standard busses that often have large 
margins available, both in terms of mass and volume. 
This allows small satellites to be carried on ‘piggy-
back’ on the main satellite itself. 
 
Figure 6 Tsinghua microsatellite mounted on Nadezhda main payload 
Mounting spacecraft onto another spacecraft has both 
advantages and disadvantages: 
- There is no standard interface, this must be 
negotiated every time 
- The mass and volume may have tight restrictions, 
but there often is room to negotiate specific 
extensions 
- There is no interface to the launch vehicle, 
technical negotiations can happen directly with 
the main passenger. This is often simpler than 
having to go through a third party. 
 
With any launch it is important to have clear 
specifications in the launch agreement on all aspects 
of the launch and associated activities, but with 
launches from the FSU this is all the more true, as 
typically there are organisations from various nations 
involved, and the activities are also often spread over 
several countries. Some of the types of organisations 
that SSTL has dealt with are the following: 
- Launch agreements with the Russian Space 
Agency 
- Technical agreements with various Russian main 
satellite providers 
- Launch and technical agreements with a 
Ukrainian main satellite provider 
- Launch campaign activity with a Ukrainian rocket 
manufacturer 




Figure 7 Cosmos launcher for Tshingua and SNAP-1 
 
In order to ensure that all agreements and permissions 
are in place it is important to have good insight in 
which organisation is concerned with what part of the 
activity: not only are there many organisations to deal 
with, but responsibilities of these organisations tend to 
change over the years.  
 
There are many western agents who are marketing 
FSU launchers, but SSTL has always found it most 
beneficial dealing with the launch providers direct. 
For this SSTL employs Commercial Space 
Technology (CST) as its agent in Moscow. CST keeps 
SSTL up to date with the latest developments in 
availability of launches and facilitates the negotiation 
and execution of the Launch Services Agreement. 
 
SSTL has launched eight spacecraft using FSU 
launches since 1995, and has signed up for two more 
launches for another seven spacecraft  
 
9 FIT-CHECK MEETING 
 
One of the first meetings after signing the contract for 
launch, and following the ICD meeting is a Fit-Check 
meeting. This is where the mechanical and electrical 
interfaces between the launcher and the spacecraft are 
physically checked against the ICD. This is done by 
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bringing those parts of the flight separation system 
together with a size and mass representative model of 
the spacecraft to the launcher manufacturing facility 
and performing a full integration, as would be carried 
out at launch site. 
 
This normally happens about six months before 
launch, before the launcher is shipped to the launch 
base. It allows for any problems that arise to be sorted 
before arriving at the launch site. Not only would 
there be little time available, but also the technical 
facilities at the launch site may not be suitable to 
manufacture or modify any equipment.  
 
The entire launch vehicle integration procedure is 
normally performed, often concluding with an actual 
firing of the separation pyros to ensure correct 
operation of all mechanical systems and electrical 
connections. This also ensures that there is appropriate 
access for tool access for the activities. This meeting 
is also a good forum to discuss any additional issues 
for the actual launch campaign. 
 
 
Figure 8 FASat-Alfa spacecraft model mounted on SICH-1 primary for the 
Fit-check meeting 
 
The ICD is updated with any particulars of note, 
ensuring that the launch campaign details can be 
finalised. 
 
10 LAUNCH CAMPAIGN 
 
It is important to check every detail of the ICD 
carefully, as technical facilities at a launch site may 
not be anywhere near to what one normally expects to 
have available at home. Launch sites tend to also be in 
remote places like Kourou in South America, or 
Plesetsk in Northern Russia. It may well take several 
days to travel to one of these sites, and as flights may 
not be available every day it could cause considerable 
delays if proceedings have to stop to get some more 
tools.  
 
To limit this risk SSTL takes complete toolsets and 
support equipment to the launch site. The mass of the 
support equipment is typically about 1000 kg, for a 
50-100 kg spacecraft, with a comparably large volume 
of shipping crates. For small organisations, like 
Universities, this may come as a shock, and the cost of 
a typical launch campaign may well be equal to what 
they budgeted to spend for the entire mission. 
 
 
Figure 9 KITSAT-2, PoSAT-1 and HealthSat-2 spacecraft on ASAP no.4 
A launch campaign can take anything from two weeks 
to over a month, but typically the spacecraft must 
arrive at the launch base about three weeks before the 
scheduled launch date to allow all preparations and 
tests to be completed. About one week before launch 
the spacecraft is integrated to the launcher, after which 
no access to the satellite is typically allowed. This 
means that the spacecraft design must be such that 
operationally there is no requirement to access the 
spacecraft during this time. Sometimes it is possible to 
charge to batteries shortly before launch, but that is 
the only activity normally allowed. SSTL always 
specifically negotiates battery charging and maximum 
periods without charging (e.g. in the case of a launch 
delay). 
 
The launch campaign is used to perform those 
activities on the spacecraft that cannot be completed 
before arrival  at the launch site: 
- Final preparation of thermal surfaces 
- Battery charging 
- Removal of lens caps and other non-flight items 
like solar array protectors 
- Insertion of flight arming plugs for the batteries 
and pyros 
- Mounting of the spacecraft on the launcher 
- Connecting of the pyrotechnics to the launcher 
- Filling of propulsion systems 
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This time is typically also used to perform a final 
operational check of the spacecraft; this to show that 
there has been no electrical damage to the systems 
during shipping.  
 
As small satellites typically have short development 
cycles, the time at the launch campaign is also used to 
further training of the operators, and to perform 
additional software tests. 
 
With most launches, the spacecraft mounts onto an 
interface structure between the launcher (or main 
passenger) and in some cases it is possible to remove 
this interface from the  launcher, and mount it on a 
separate stand. This is shown clearly in the case of the 
Ariane-4 ASAP. This entire ASAP is positioned in a 
separate building, where the secondary spacecraft can 
be integrated to it at relative leisure. Only at a late 
stage is the complete integrated structure then moved 
to the launch vehicle to be integrated as one complete 
unit.  
 
Figure 10 TiungSat spacecraft being mounted onto its interface 
For some FSU launches the spacecraft were mounted 
onto their individual supports, then the integrated 
secondary spacecraft with the support are moved to 
and mounted onto the main spacecraft  
 
This has the major advantage that any operation near 
or on the main passenger or the launch vehicle is 
performed solely by the main spacecraft operators or 
the launch agency, involving only interfaces between 
units supplied by themselves. This means that is it 
very unlikely that there would be any problems with 
the integration at this point, which is important, as this 
mostly happens very shortly before launch. 
 
11 SHARED LAUNCHES 
 
Where there is no primary payload paying the bulk of 
the launch cost, the cost must be shared between the 
passengers on a different basis. Unlike the secondary 
launch, where a charge is made either on a fixed 
amount per kilo or on a marginal cost basis, here the 
entire launch price must be distributed.  
 
The distribution of the launch costs over the satellites 
can depend on a number of factors: 
- The mass of each spacecraft 
- The volume of each spacecraft 
- Any special requirements of individual spacecraft 
like orbit, launch date etc. 
- Multiple launch deals 
 
The advantage of a shared launch is that there is the 
possibility for any of the passengers to influence 
aspects of the launch, and if there are specific 
problems the launch could be delayed. This is unlike a 
secondary launch, were if the satellite is not ready in 
time the launch will go ahead with a mass dummy. 
 
 
Figure 11 TiungSat-1 and others on DNEPR launch platform 
With a shared launch the entire mass capability and 
the complete available volume inside the fairing can 
be used. It can be divided up between the passengers 
in the most optimum way. This in itself may require 
joint negotiation between the individual payloads 
 
The Malaysian TiungSat spacecraft was launched 
together with a group of other small satellites on a 
shared Dnepr vehicle, and SSTL has signed up several 
Cosmos launchers to launch the eight Disaster 
Monitoring Constellation (DMC) spacecraft. This is a 
group of spacecraft working as a single constellation 
providing daily imaging of any place on Earth. These 
are owned by different customers, and they are built 
on different timescales, therefore the launches must be 
coordinated to ensure that all spacecraft end up in the 
same orbit. 
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 Figure 12 DMC-1 spacecraft 
As there are enough spacecraft to fill up the launchers 
it was possible to sign up several rockets at once, and 
fill them up with a selection of spacecraft. 
 
12 PRIMARY LAUNCHES 
 
The development of small launchers, especially those 
based on ex ICBMs has made it feasible to consider 
launching a small satellite as primary customer in an 
affordable manner. SSTLs 325 kg UoSAT-12 
experimental minisatellite was launched in 1999 as the 
primary and only customer on the first Dnepr orbital 
flight.  
 
Figure 13 UoSAT-12 fit-check model mounted into the DNEPR head 
adapter 
The primary customer typically has full control over 
the final orbit and the launch time and date, allowing 
full mission flexibility. In the case of the UoSAT-12 
launch the launch provider decided the launch time 
and orbit, as it was a joint experimental activity 
between SSTL and Kosmotras, the latter 
demonstrating the full availability of the launch 
service, including ground facilities and support. 
 
Figure 14 DNEPR launching the UoSAT-12 spacecraft 
SSTL used UoSAT-12 to demonstrate several new 
platform and payload capabilities, including attitude 
agility, orbital control and high-resolution Earth 
observation. 
 
13 LAUNCH CAMPAIGN PROBLEMS 
 
No two launch campaigns are the same, and there are 
always lessons to be learned from problems that 
occurred during the execution of all activities. 
Problems have occurred with both western and FSU 
launch campaigns, but by having experience, being 
fully prepared and by having planned sufficient 
contingency time SSTL has always managed to make 
the launch in time, and successfully complete the 
launch campaign activities. 
Small satellites on tight budgets can only allow short 
launch campaigns. There is little time between arrival 
at the launch site and launch. This means that it may 
be difficult to make up for any lost time, and it would 
be very costly to simply ship the spacecraft and 
support staff over early, as this would substantially 
increase the cost of the launch campaign. 
 
Some examples of the actual problems that had to be 
dealt with during previous SSTL launch campaigns 
are the following: 
- Shipping delay: two spacecraft stayed behind in 
transit in Paris, whilst the support staff was 
already in Kourou, it took another week before 
cargo space was found on a flight, as there are not 
many flights to French Guyana. Most large 
spacecraft travel by privately chartered aircraft to 
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avoid such occurrences, but this is not possible on 
a small satellite budget, 
- Customs delay: Two spacecraft spent several 
months in Moscow customs, as there was some 
disagreement over the details of the shipping list: 
whereas in Kourou a description of ‘box of hand 
tools’ would suffice, here an individual 
description of every screwdriver and spanner was 
required. This is easy enough when known in 
advance, but with no access to the boxes it is 
difficult to regenerate a list with that level of 
detail. 
- Tax issues: For space launches mostly all items 
are deemed temporary imports: the support 
equipment because it will be shipped back to the 
UK; and the spacecraft because it will be 
launched into space. For one spacecraft the local 
customs officers thought otherwise, and 
demanded a 100% tax on the value of the 
spacecraft. This was sorted by getting the 
ambassador of the satellite customer’s country to 
quickly negotiate an ‘agreement of technical 
cooperation’ between the countries, which then 
removed the tax liability.  
 
14 SPACECRAFT DESIGN FOR SHARED 
LAUNCH 
SSTL spacecraft have always been designed to be 
launched as secondary or shared passengers. This has 
meant simple and unchanging mechanical and 
electrical interfaces, and for instance launching the 
spacecraft ’dead’ only switching on when separated 
from the launcher in orbit. This has made it simpler to 
negotiate launch services agreements, as there are few 
safety issues to deal with, and for a second launch 
with the same provider only a few updates are 
required. 
 
15 PRESENT LAUNCHES 
 
SSTL has signed a single launch services agreement 
essentially procuring three Kosmos launch vehicles 
under one contract for eight satellites including five 
for the DMC. 
. 
 
Figure 16 Cosmos launcher with ALSat being raised for launch 
The first of these launches was successfully completed 
in November 2002, launching the ALSat satellite for 
Algeria from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Northern 
Russia. As this paper is being produced we are in the 
middle of preparing for the second of the three 
Kosmos launches 
This one will launch three SSTL satellites together 
with two Russian and one Korean craft into Sun 
Synchronous Orbit at the end of July 2003.  
 
Figure 17 NigeriaSat-1 being prepared for thermal vacuum test 
 
16 CONCLUSION 
SSTL’s experience of launching twenty-one spacecraft 
in twenty-two years has been described, detailing the 
specific attributes of launching a small satellite as 
either secondary or shared passenger with a main 
payload on a launcher. Specific problems that can 
occur and have actually occurred over the years have 
been described. This experience may well help 
preventing others from suffering the same difficulties, 
and make it easier and less daunting to embark on a 
launch activity for a small satellite. 
“Prepare for Any Eventuality” 
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